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THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: HOTEL 
COMPANY CEO PERCEPTIONS OF 




The chief executive officers (CEOs) of 96 multisite, U.S.-based hotel owner/operator companies 
were interviewed and asked to describe the dominant upcoming threats and opportunities they 
perceived for their segment. Responses converged in describing two major threats (overbuilding 
and economic downturn) but were far more divergent in descriptions of opportunities. This 
pattern may emerge from the nature of threats and opportunities, from quirks of information 
dissemination and processing in the hotel industry, or from systematic biases in the perception of 
CEOs. Our data provide strong evidence of the impact of segment on threat and opportunity 
perceptions, as is appropriate to a rational model. Tests of potentially influential factors at the 
CEO and team levels provided no evidence of bias. 
KEYWORDS: environmental scanning; executive decisions; strategy process; SWOT analysis; 





Information about the business environment does not come prepackaged into clean strategic 
issues—it is, by its nature, complex, vague, and ambiguous (Daft & Weick, 1984; Dutton, Fahey, 
& Narayan, 1983; Walsh, 1995). Strategic issues must be interpreted. They are not given in the 
environment (Jackson & Dutton, 1988). If organizational success is influenced by strategic 
choice, and if strategic choice is in turn driven by issue interpretation (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984), 
then executives’ interpretation processes are pivotal to organizational success. It is therefore 
crucial to understand how managers gather information and how they analyze and categorize the 
data in their environments. 
Recently, there has been considerable debate in the strategic management literature about the 
magnitude of the role of deliberate and rational strategic planning (e.g., Hitt & Tyler, 1991; 
Mintzberg, 1994; Rajagopalan, Rasheed, & Datta, 1993; Schwenk, 1995). This debate might be 
seen as casting doubt on the importance of strategic issue-diagnosis processes. However, we 
assert that executives’ scanning, issue identification, and interpretation processes are of 
considerable importance regardless of whether strategic action is seen as primarily deliberate or 
emergent, rational or not, long-term or short-term. Executives’ understandings of environmental 
forces determine their strategic actions (Schneider & DeMeyer, 1991). Executives’ 
interpretations of threats and opportunities in the financial realm, in markets, technology, and 
elsewhere, influence how they manage their companies. If one allows that executives are capable 
of strategic action or response, then environmental scanning and interpretation processes must be 
recognized as playing a pivotal role in organizational functioning. 
Executive interpretation of environmental issues defines subsequent organizational adaptations 
to environment (Daft & Weick, 1984; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992) and drives strategic choices 
(Boulton, Lindsay, Franklin, & Rue, 1982; Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Dutton & Jackson, 1987). 
Executives’ interpretations of the environment can also influence the processes by which 
strategic choices are made (Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). In 
addition, interpretations tend to influence future perceptions: It is well-documented that an 
observer’s beliefs and expectations tend to bias perceptions toward confirmation (e.g., Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991). The impact of labels on perception and decision processes is especially important 
in issue diagnosis, because diagnosis in turn influences executives’ future interpretations of the 
environment (e.g., Beyer, Chattopadhyay, Glick, & Pugliese, 1997; Jackson & Dutton, 1988). 
Executive interpretations influence critical decisions, and, perhaps more critically, influence 
future perceptions and interpretations: Executive perceptions tend to snowball as they accrue 
confirmatory evidence. 
Some empirical research has explored these critical processes in hospitality companies. Costa 
(1995) reviewed the environmental scanning literature and dis- cussed its application to 
hospitality. Costa and Teare (1994) discussed Portuguese hotel companies’ business 
environments and reviewed literature on environ- mental scanning. Olsen, Murthy, and Teare 
(1994) explored the scanning processes and threat or opportunity perceptions of 54 international 
hospitality chief executive officers (CEOs). The present work updates that of Olsen et al.  to the 
current business environment and examines a larger sample of U.S.-based companies. 
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Furthermore, we extend the stream of research by examining factors at the company level, the 
CEO level, and the top management team level that might influence CEO perceptions. 
 
Rational Influences on Strategic Issue Interpretation 
Hypothesis 1: Strategic issue perception will be affected by the following rational factors: (a) 
primary market segment, (b) ownership structure, and (c) company size. 
Strategic issues in the environment are likely to have different practical implications for different 
companies (Rajagopalan et al. , 1993). For example, companies that serve different market 
segments will be affected, to some extent, by different factors. A market trend that affects one 
group of customers might not affect another, and competition in one segment might have only a 
slight effect on other segments. The ownership structure of companies is likely to affect strategic 
issue interpretation, as subsidiary companies, privately held companies, and publicly traded 
companies face different capital environments. Opportunities that require capital or that make 
capital available may look different to CEOs who operate in different capital environments. 
Likewise, a stock market downturn might easily represent a threat for a publicly traded company 
and an opportunity for a privately held company: Although a downturn might reduce leisure 
travel across the board, it would also put privately held companies at an advantage from a 
capital- generation standpoint. Finally, company size could serve as a buffer to many threats, as a 
large company could presumably weather more environmental turbulence than a small one. 
These arguments describe internal factors that can be expected to influence the actual strategic 
importance of a given environmental occurrence. The impact of these variables on strategic issue 
diagnosis may be considered rational, as they derive from an organization’s perceived capacity to 
respond effectively to an environmental event. They are represented in Hypothesis 1. 
 
Individual-Level Influences on Strategic Issue Interpretation 
Hypothesis 2: Strategic issue perception will be affected by the following CEO characteristics: 
(a) primary functional background, (b) tenure, (c) education, and (d) cognitive style. 
There are several nonrational factors that might influence issue interpretation. CEO perceptions 
of strategic issues in their environments are influenced by individual cognitive processes and 
biases (Beyer et al. , 1997; Schwenk, 1995; Stubbart, 1989). When an individual decision maker 
faces relevant information that is ambiguous and complex, he or she will tend to simplify that 
information using heuristics or rules of thumb (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976; 
Stubbart, 1989). Walsh (1995) suggests that ambiguous streams of strategic environmental 
information are made understandable by the application of knowledge structures or cognitive 
maps that are formed in the minds of decision makers as a result of prior experiences. Jackson 
and Dutton (1988) describe this process as schema- driven information processing. 
Two dominant schemas are the ideas of threats and opportunities, which have long been applied 
to strategic environmental interpretation (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). Once an issue has been 
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labeled an opportunity or a threat by the senior executive, it tends to be widely recognized as 
such by the other members of the organization (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Dutton et al. , 1983; 
Jackson & Dutton, 1988). Furthermore, the identification of a given issue as a threat tends to 
shape further consideration of and response to that issue, both by individual decision makers and 
by groups (Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Staw et al. , 1981). 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) proposed that executives’ functional back- grounds, educations, 
and other personal attributes influence the environment elements to which they are sensitive and 
the strategic responses they propose. Evidence for this proposed influence has been found by 
Walsh (1988) and Beyer et al.  (1997). One reason for this influence is that executives are likely 
to interpret ambiguous events as being similar to events they have experienced previously, 
because some attributes of the event might be familiar. Prahalad and Bettis (1986) describe this 
pattern, noting that the reasoning by analogy that results is sometimes inappropriate. They argue 
that executives’ previous response modes have been reinforced by prior successes and that this 
reinforcement inhibits the perception of events in novel ways. Starbuck and Milliken (1988) 
suggest that executives will tend to favor strategies that will keep their tasks central to the 
operation of the company. Walsh (1988) and Beyer et al.  (1997) also found evidence for a 
relation- ship between managers’ functional backgrounds and their interpretations of ambiguous 
stimuli. 
Similar reasoning supports the notion that executive perceptions will be influenced by the length 
of their tenure in the position and by their level and type of education. Executives who have 
experienced a particular type of industry crisis during their tenure are likely to be more sensitive 
to signs of a repeat of that crisis. Advanced education might also affect perception and 
interpretation, as advanced management courses typically spend time focusing on patterns of 
strategic issues. Environmental scanning procedures and interpretation processes learned in 
school are likely to carry over into executives’ professional careers. 
Finally, executive attributes such as intelligence or cognitive style might influence their strategic 
issue diagnoses. Stubbart (1989) and Ungson, Braunstein, and Hall (1981) emphasize the fact 
that issue diagnosis is fundamentally a cognitive process. Thus, CEOs’ cognitive habits and 
proclivities are likely to influence it. The above arguments focus on the impact of individual 
perceiver characteristics on strategic issue diagnosis and are represented in Hypothesis 2. 
 
Organizational and Institutional Influences on Issue Interpretation 
Hypothesis 3: Strategic issue perception will be affected by the following company 
characteristics: (a) company age and (b) top management team climate. 
Issue interpretation does not happen in a vacuum, and CEO interpretations are likely to be 
influenced by aspects of the organization and of the institutional environment they inhabit. Daft 
and Weick (1984) suggest that the age of the organization influences issue interpretation, as 
company history or prior experience influences the perception of ambiguous stimuli. This 
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process is similar to executives’ analogical reasoning as described by Prahalad and Bettis (1986) 
but focuses on organizational memories rather than individual ones. 
Dutton et al.  (1983) describe a negotiation process whereby organization members pool their 
beliefs and determine the organization’s shared belief structures through political maneuvering 
and confrontation. The impact of executive group political climate on issue diagnosis has 
similarly been indicated by Schwenk (1995) and Rajagopalan et al.  (1993). Within a negotiation 
over shared issue interpretations, the credibility of different executive group members (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991) is also likely to determine which group members exert the most influence over the 
outcome. The political climate of the top management group— its level of true participative 
discussion, intragroup trust, and collaboration—is likely to influence the potential impact of 
group members other than the CEO. These lines of reasoning are represented in Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4: Strategic issue perception will be affected by the frequency of issue coverage in 
the industry press. 
Finally, issue interpretation is likely to be influenced by the larger institutional climate in which 
hotel companies operate. Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) note that executive perceptions in a given 
industry are likely to be influenced by their shared exposure to the coverage of strategic issues in 
trade journals. Starbuck (1975) notes that executive perceptions will be affected by shared 
membership in industry associations and attendance at conferences and trade shows. Sutcliffe 
and Huber (1998) find that industry influences strategic perceptions, but they do not disentangle 
rational elements of this influence from nonrational elements. Executives remember the 
explanations that the industry press has presented to them for massive failures or successes in 
recent history, and these memories are likely to color their perceptions of their current business 
environment. Institutional forces are represented in Hypothesis 4. 
METHOD 
The CEOs of 96 multisite, U.S.-based hotel companies agreed to participate in this research in 
return for a benchmarked feedback report on their company’s executive group process. These 
companies were drawn from the American Hotel & Motel Association membership directory, 
were U.S.-based, and were owner- operators of at least three properties.1 Operating revenues for 
participating companies ranged from $1.9 million to more than $600 million, with median 
revenues of $37 million. The median participating company size was 8 properties. The average 
company size was 42.8 properties, but excluding the largest 2 companies from this calculation 
dropped the average size to 23.5 properties. The companies represented a range of segments: 54 
of the participating CEOs identified their primary segment as mid-priced, 20 defined theirs as 
economy, and 16 defined theirs as luxury. 
The principal investigator conducted 1-hour telephone interviews with the participating CEOs.3 
Early in the interviews, the CEOs were asked, “First, I would like to ask you about your 
company’s business environment. What do you see as the single most important source of 
business opportunities for your segment of the hotel industry over the next few years,” followed 
by the analogous question, phrased identically, for business threats. Executives were thus 
encouraged to offer a single, brief response—essentially the most vivid threat or opportunity that 
6 
 
came to mind. Responses to these questions were written down and were later categorized for 
statistical purposes. 
To supplement and help explain CEO perceptions of threats and opportunities, we gathered 
information about the company, about the CEO personally, and about the top management group 
dynamics. This additional data were gathered in the remainder of the interview, through paper 
surveys completed by the rest of the top management group at each company (as identified by 
the CEO), and through a financial and operational performance questionnaire sent separately to 
the company’s financial officer. Of the 96 companies, 78 provided at least one additional top 
management team member survey, and 60 companies completed the financial and operational 
performance questionnaire. 
Company-level factors were expected to influence CEO perceptions of threats and opportunities 
by affecting the resources available to each company, the his- tory through which it had passed, 
the customer base, and, as a result, what factors actually might present threats or opportunities to 
that company. Most of these company-level factors could be considered as affecting the true 
picture of threats and opportunities, rather than affecting primarily the perception of same. These 
variables were measured from a variety of sources: Market segment, as noted above, was 
specified by the CEO during the interview. Company size was measured through the financial 
and operational performance questionnaire, as the total number of employees or full-time 
equivalents managed by the company. Company age was assessed as years since founding. Both 
company size and age were transformed, using a logarithmic transformation to correct skewed 
distributions.5 On the operational questionnaire, we also asked whether the company was 
privately held, reasoning that ownership structure would influence the CEOs’ sensitivity to 
fluctuations in financial markets. 
CEO personal data was assessed as a factor that might influence which environmental factors 
attract the top executive’s attention and how information is processed. This data was assessed 
primarily through the interview. CEOs were asked when they assumed their current position to 
determine tenure, which was, in turn corrected for skew using a logarithmic transformation. 
CEOs were also asked to specify their primary functional background and their highest academic 
degree earned. This latter piece of information was treated both as a categorical and as a 
continuous variable (by translation into “years of education”). Results between the two 
operationalizations of CEO education were the same, and so only “years of education” results are 
reported here. Finally, CEO cognitive style was assessed using Neuberg and Newsome’s (1993) 
“personal need for structure” scale, which assesses a dispositional difference in motivation to 
cognitively structure the world in simple, unambiguous ways. The coefficient alpha for this 11- 
item scale was .80. 
Top management group processes were considered as a possible influence on CEO perceptions. 
Specifically, we imagined that CEOs whose top management groups practiced more 
collaboration might be more likely to identify threats and opportunities in functional areas other 
than their own. Collaboration was measured using the averaged perceptions of top management 
group members and was assessed with a scale based on Putnam and Wilson’s (1982) 
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Organizational Conflict and Communication Inventory (OCCI). Cronbach’s alpha for this 5-item 
scale was .81. 
To assess industry press coverage of a particular threat or opportunity, we searched the 
International Hospitality and Tourism Database for articles published in calendar years 1995 and 
1996, using keywords drawn from issue descriptions, as well as synonyms. We then checked 
each listing to make sure the topic was correctly categorized and tallied the total number of 
articles published during the years in question for each topic. Only those articles that had the 
topic in question as their primary focus were counted. 
The extreme diversity of responses limited statistical analysis possibilities. However, a few 
responses occurred with sufficient frequency to allow for analysis: In response to the query on 
threats, 58 CEOs mentioned overbuilding, and 11 mentioned larger economic factors. In 
response to the query on opportunities, 16 CEOs mentioned commercial business, and 11 
mentioned leisure travel. Thus, we created dummy variables for these four strategic issue 
identifications and used logistical regression and chi-square tests to assess the impact of 
continuous and categorical predictor variables, respectively, on the frequency of these strategic 
issue diagnoses. Our analysis is limited, then, to an exploration of whether the predictive factors 
described in Hypotheses 1 through 4 influence the likelihood of CEOs’ identifying the two most 
popular threats or opportunities. Given the high number of categorical variables in this study 
design, we could not generate a correlation matrix of all variables. 
By drawing on additional personal and company information provided by the CEO and other 
senior executives, we were able to assess the impact of market segment, company size, 
ownership structure, company age, CEO tenure, CEO functional background, CEO cognitive 
style, top management group collaboration, and industry press on the CEOs’ identification of 
overbuilding and the economy as potential sources of threat and of commercial and leisure travel 
as sources of opportunity. 
RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 show the CEO responses, broken down by market segment. Table 3 shows a 
correlation matrix of the predictors and the four most frequent CEO responses. 
Hypothesis 1a was supported by these data. Market segment influenced CEOs’ identification of 
overbuilding as a primary threat (chi-square = 12.31, df = 3, p < .01). Economy companies were 
most likely to identify overbuilding as a threat, followed by mid-price and luxury segments. Out 
of 20 economy companies, 16 identified overbuilding, as did 35 out of 54 mid-price companies 
and 4 out of 16 luxury companies. Market segment did not significantly affect CEOs’ 
identification of the economy or wars as a primary threat (chi-square = 4.50, df = 3, n.s.), of 
business travel as an opportunity (chi-square = 3.14, df = 3, n.s.), or of leisure travel as an 
opportunity (chi-square = 1.57, df = 3, n.s.). 
Hypothesis 1b received moderate support from these data. Company owner- ship structure had a 
marginal effect on CEOs’ identification of overbuilding as a primary threat (chi-square = 3.21, df 
= 1, p < .10). Out of 45 privately held companies, 28 identified overbuilding as a threat, 
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compared to only 4 out of 12 publicly traded companies. There was no significant effect on 
CEOs’ identification of the economy or wars as a primary threat (chi-square = 0.27, df = 1, n.s.). 
Ownership structure had a marginal effect on identification of business travel as a primary 
opportunity (chi-square = 3.63, df = 1, p < .10). In our sample, no publicly traded companies 
identified business travel as a key opportunity, whereas several private companies did. 
Ownership structure had no significant effect on the identification of leisure travel as a primary 
source of opportunity (chi-square = 0.01, df = 1, n.s.). 
Hypothesis 1c received only weak support from these data. Company size had no significant 
effect on the identification of overbuilding or the economy as primary threats (b = .12, n.s.; and b 
= –.15, n.s., respectively). However, company size had a marginally significant effect on the 
identification of business travel as a source of opportunity (b = –.64, p < .10), with larger 
companies tending not to select business travelers as an opportunity. Company size had no 
significant effect on the identification of leisure travel as a source of opportunity (b = .00, n.s.). 
Hypothesis 2a received only weak support from these data. CEO functional background had no 
significant effect on the identification of overbuilding or the economy as primary threats (chi-
square = 5.30, df = 8, n.s., and chi-square = 4.06, df = 8, n.s., respectively). CEO functional 
background had a marginally significant effect on the identification of business travel as a source 
of opportunity (chi- square = 14.75, df = 8, p < .10). CEOs were most likely to select this 
opportunity when their functional background was in human resources or in something non- 
traditional. CEO functional background had no significant effect on the identification of leisure 
travel as a source of opportunity (chi-square = 5.65, df = 8, n.s.). 
Hypothesis 2b was only weakly supported by these data. Length of CEO tenure had a marginally 
significant effect on the identification of overbuilding as a primary threat (b = .33, p < .10) and 
had no significant effect of the identification of the economy as a primary threat (b = –.26, n.s.). 
CEO tenure had no significant effect on the identification of business or leisure travel as a key 
source of opportunities (b = –.09, n.s.; and b = .55, n.s., respectively). 
Hypothesis 2c was not supported by these data. Years of CEO education had no significant effect 
on the identification of overbuilding or the economy as primary threats (b = .15, n.s.; and b = 
.04, n.s., respectively), or on the identification of business or leisure travel as a key source of 
opportunities (b= –.19, n.s.; and b= –.24, n.s., respectively). 
Hypothesis 2d was not supported by these data. CEO need for simple structure had no significant 
effect on the identification of overbuilding or the economy as primary threats (b= .02, n.s.; and 
b= .01, n.s., respectively), or on the identification of business or leisure travel as a key source of 
opportunities (b= .03, n.s.; and b = .00, n.s., respectively). 
Hypothesis 3a received marginal support from these data. Company age had a marginally 
significant effect on the assessment of overbuilding as a primary threat (b= –.70, p < .10) and on 
the assessment of the economy as a source of threat (b= 1.39, p < .10). CEOs of older companies 
were slightly more likely to note the economy and less likely to note overbuilding as pivotal 
threats. Company age had no significant effect on the identification of business or leisure travel 
as a source of opportunity (b = –.19, n.s.; and b = .19, n.s., respectively) 
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Hypothesis 3b was not supported by these data. Top management group collaboration had no 
significant effect on the identification of overbuilding or the economy as primary threats (b= .09, 
n.s.; and b= –.15, n.s., respectively), or on the identification of business or leisure travel as a key 
source of opportunities (b= .23, n.s.; and b = –.15, n.s., respectively). 
Hypothesis 4 received support from these data, as the frequency of issue cover- age in the 
industry press substantially paralleled CEOs’ rankings. The threat of overbuilding was the most 
frequently discussed business threat in the industry press, with 20 articles. This frequency 
matched the very frequent CEO mention of overbuilding as the key business threat. Two issues 
were tied at second most frequently mentioned in the industry press, with 15 articles each: They 
were (a) pressure on room tariffs due to business cycles or a slowdown of the economy and (b) 
human resource–related issues such as employee retention and turnover. The economy was the 
CEOs’ second most frequently mentioned source of threat. However, despite frequent press 
attention, human resource issues were high- lighted by only a single CEO out of 96. Of the 
mentioned opportunities, local economic growth was the most frequently described by industry 
journals, with 35 articles. However, only 5% of CEOs mentioned this source of opportunity. 
Commercial business and leisure travel were considered to be very important opportunities by 
the CEOs. These issues were the second and third most frequently mentioned opportunities in the 
industry press, with 25 and 15 articles respectively. 
DISCUSSION 
The most striking result of this research is the clear dominance of overbuilding as the primary 
threat noted by more than 60% of the CEOs surveyed in this study. No such convergence was 
evident for the category of opportunities. It is possible that this contrast represents a fundamental 
difference between opportunities and threats: Perhaps threats are universal, whereas 
opportunities by their nature must be relatively unique for each company if they are to generate 
competitive advantages. It is also possible that the difference in convergence emerges from 
Jackson and Dutton’s (1988) observation that CEOs are reluctant to disavow a threat once it is 
detected, whereas they show great readiness to disavow detected opportunities. Jackson and 
Dutton’s argument implies that threat perceptions are more long-lived than are opportunity 
perceptions, and so convergence between CEOs might have a greater chance to develop. The 
question of whether the difference in convergence is fundamental to the nature of threats and 
opportunities, or whether it emerges instead from the different cognitive processes that are 
evoked by consideration of positive and negative outcome potentials, is an issue for future 
examination. Likewise, there remains the question of whether the observed convergence pattern 
would hold in a different business environment or in a different year. 
The predictors described as rational factors in strategic issue diagnosis received the best support 
from these data. Selected market segment influenced the perception of overbuilding as a threat, 
and there was marginal evidence that ownership structure influenced perceptions of both threats 
and opportunities. Company age, which can be considered as a company-level perceptual filter, 
received marginal support as an influence factor. There was little support for the influence of 
individual CEO perceptual factors or other company-level influences on threat and opportunity 
recognition. The frequency of articles in the industry press was associated with CEOs’ issue 
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diagnoses, although some issues received substantial press but were seldom noted by CEOs as 
being of central importance. Labor shortages were discussed at length in the industry press but 
were seldom mentioned by the company CEOs, perhaps because they tend to consider staffing a 
local or operational issue rather than a strategic one. Local economic growth was high- lighted 
strongly by the press but was mentioned as an opportunity by only five CEOs. It is possible that 
economic growth represents a positive environmental factor that CEOs perceive as being out of 
their control, and therefore it might not fit well with the mental category of opportunity (Dutton 
& Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988). Whether industry press represented a causal factor 
or a simple reflection of industry reality cannot be distinguished in these data. 
The results of this study should not be interpreted to mean that cognitive biases and top 
management group process do not exert influence on the strategic issue- diagnosis process. 
Logistical analysis has very low power for the detection of real effects that sway as little as 10% 
of the sample population, and so this may be viewed as a very conservative test of most of these 
hypotheses. Furthermore, null results can emerge from a variety of causes, and the design of the 
current study allowed for only single operationalizations of group process and cognitive style. A 
future study might focus primarily on these factors and thus allow for more and varied 
operationalizations. Future studies might also allow CEOs to list and prioritize several potential 
threats and opportunities, rather than just the primary threat and opportunity. Such an expansion 
would allow for more fine-grained analysis and could further clarify this important area of 
organizational research. 
In sum, this study examined perceptions of threats and opportunities by 96 hotel company CEOs. 
The vast majority of them converged in describing over- building as the key business threat for 
the coming years, but there was no such convergence for opportunities. The source of 
convergence in describing threats is not yet clear, nor is the lack of convergence in describing 
opportunities explained. Rational issue-diagnosis factors such as segment and ownership 
structure influenced CEO perceptions, but there was sparse evidence of nonrational influences on 
the process. Industry press coverage was associated with the frequency of CEOs’ mention of 
different strategic issues, but there were several exceptions to this pattern. Although these results 
are not counterintuitive, they represent an important step in the systematic, empirical 
examination and clarification of a critical process in hospitality management. 
It is perhaps early yet to derive practical implications from this research. The results could be 
interpreted to mean that managers are on the right track in their strategic thinking. However, the 
nonrational influences on senior managers’ issue diagnosis processes should be considered as 
caveats even though the current study found little hard evidence to support them. Managers’ use 
of the industry press in diagnosing threats and opportunities should also be considered carefully: 
It is very curious that one of the most commonly noted issues—a labor scarcity—was noted by 
only one of the CEOs as a potential threat. Managers’ strategic thinking is affected by both 
rational and nonrational factors. The better these factors can be identified and measured, the 
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